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Key Points 
Libya has proved to be a particularly hard case for peacebuilding. Since the fall of Gaddafi’s 
regime in 2011, everything has seemed to conspire against the transition process. The idea of a 
stabilisation force for Libya has met political resistance in most European countries, because 
there is little appetite for long-term interventions that carry a high risk of casualties. The hard 
truth is, however, that ground forces are a necessary component of stabilisation in the country.  
Recommendations 
1. Understand Libya’s fragility. Libya should not be seen as the battleground for Daesh 
and regional powers, but as a nation confronting fragility, tribal rivalries and 
endemic violence. Foreign powers should understand this, and act to address the 
causes of this fragility, because failing to do so would backfire against their national 
interests.  
2. European and US domestic politics should not get in the way of stabilisation. There is no 
quick fix or low-cost, low-risk operation in Libya. Sustained commitment, adequate 
financial resources and a military force on the ground are required to stabilise the 
country in the long term. Political leaders should explain the implications of Libya 
becoming a ‘Somalia in the Mediterranean’ to their electorates.  
3. More diplomacy is needed to engage regional actors. It is the responsibility of diplomats 
to solve political logjams. The combined diplomatic clout of the European Union 
and the United States is huge. EU member states must act together to engage with 
regional powers. 
4. Military plans should include a post-conflict peacebuilding strategy. There must be a 
multidimensional and integrated post-conflict strategy to guarantee political and 
institutional development. Humanitarian, security and development actors should 
be allowed to operate in Libya. A UN protectorate could be the cornerstone of this 
framework. From being a hard case for peacebuilding, Libya has the potential to 
become a model of effective multilateralism, if key actors begin working on a 
division of labour. 
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The strategy that makes the most sense for 
everyone is often the hardest one to implement. 
Libya has proved to be a particularly hard case 
for peacebuilding. After the fall of Gaddafi’s 
regime, everything seemed to conspire against 
the transition process in Libya: the division of 
the country among armed militias, divergent 
political interests of foreign powers, complex 
socio-historical conditions, and the tribal 
struggle for the control of natural resources. All 
this has made any post-conflict or state-building 
intervention by the international community 
virtually impossible.  
While these conditions hampered plans after 
NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in 2011, it 
is also true that Western policies and diplomacy 
fell short of what was needed to address the 
fragility in Libya. A NATO stabilisation force 
deployed immediately after Gaddafi’s ousting 
could not work, as no one in the Arab world 
wanted a large Western force in Libya. 
Nevertheless, alternative options were not 
explored with sufficient zeal, such as a mix of an 
enhanced role for the UN in stabilisation, a 
deeper and more rapid EU presence to handle 
border and maritime security, and a policing 
role for Arab partners. The reasons for this 
failing are manifold. All legitimate governing 
authorities in post-revolution Libya have 
refused external interference in their territories. 
Economic worries, re-election campaigns and 
domestic political concerns distracted the 
British, French and Italian governments from 
pushing for the deployment of a basic security 
force. Instead, when the security situation 
deteriorated and the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State, or Daesh, formed an offshoot in Libya in 
November 2014, uncoordinated targeted 
military interventions, through the use of special 
forces, were planned and carried out by the US, 
the UK and France. Meanwhile, Arab partners 
such as Egypt and the UAE were also 
conducting bombing raids.  
As the security situation in Libya spirals out of 
control, which includes the expansion of Daesh, 
there seems to be little choice now but to restore 
basic security conditions for a normal transition 
to resume, through the use of military force. As 
the UN Security Council is prevented by Russia 
(and China) from adopting a mandate by way of 
a binding resolution, a request from a legitimate 
Libyan government still seems to be the legal 
and political conditio sine qua non in many 
European capitals and in Washington for a 
military operation to be launched. However, as 
military preparations are already underway in 
Western capitals, it is important not to repeat 
the mistakes of the 2011 campaign. The idea that 
‘quick fix’ air strikes or military force alone can 
save populations from atrocities committed by 
militant extremists has proved illusory. Re-
engagement should be accompanied by a clearer 
vision for stabilisation on the ground, by 
reconstruction of the security system, and by 
appropriate support for a peaceful constitutional 
process.   
The political stalemate 
Since 2014, there has been a political schism in 
Libya, with two parliaments and two 
governments: an Islamist government in Tripoli, 
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Libyan 
party and supported by Qatar and Turkey, and 
an anti-Islamist one in Tobruk, supported by the 
West, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. An 
illustration of Libya’s political rupture is Egypt’s 
support for General Haftar. Haftar is seen in 
Cairo as the guarantor of stability and the main 
opponent of Islamist terrorism, but armed 
militias, fighters and Islamist factions aligned 
with the General National Congress in Tripoli 
fiercely oppose his inclusion in a unity 
government. Haftar is just one of the many 
‘elephants in the room’ blocking reconciliation 
in a legitimate unified Libyan government.  
International support to move the political 
process forward has been led by the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), 
which since November 2015 has been headed by 
German diplomat Martin Kobler, and 
empowered by UN Resolution 2259. Efforts to 
bring the competing parliaments and their 
backers together in a Government of National 
Accord (GNA) were further supported through 
the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015, a 
political process led jointly by Italy and the 
United States.  
The Rome Communiqué is the basis of the UN-
brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) 
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reached at Skhirat on 16 December 2015. This 
agreement appeared to mark a turning point in 
Libya’s post-revolution. Fayez al-Sarraj was 
designated prime minister, and a nine-member 
Presidency Council has been formed. However, 
when the Presidency Council presented a 
cabinet for approval by the House of 
Representatives in mid-January 2016, the House 
voted to endorse the LPA in principle, but it 
requested that the Presidency Council nominate 
a new and smaller cabinet. Disagreement 
persists over the number of ministries that 
should be created, their regional affiliation and 
who will work in key areas such as internal 
affairs and defence. 
The security vacuum 
The LPA impasse is preventing the 
reconstruction of Libya’s security sector, and 
hence the provision of basic security to protect 
the civilian population. Furthermore, the conflict 
between rival governments in Tripoli and 
Tobruk1 since 2014 has created a security 
vacuum that is too big to fill. Daesh made use of 
this vacuum to gain a foothold in November 
2014, forming a Libyan branch with a force 
currently estimated by the American 
administration to number up to 5,000 men – but 
this figure is likely to increase as recruitment 
efforts are proving successful and a number of 
Libyan locals and militias are joining Daesh. 
Foreign jihadists from Daesh have also 
infiltrated the central section of Libya’s 
coastline, exploiting rivalries between local 
militias and ethnic groups to expand their 
sphere of influence between the two Libyan 
governments. Libya has rapidly become the 
home of the largest Daesh-affiliated groups 
outside Iraq and Syria, headquartered in the 
town of Sirte. The presence of Daesh constitutes 
a major threat to the future of the transition, to 
the security of neighbouring countries in the 
Maghreb and the Sahel, and to Europe.  
                                                     
1 For a detailed account of Libya’s second civil war 
(2014-present), see D. Gartenstein-Ross and N. Barr 
(2015), “Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s escalating civil 
war”, International Centre for Counter Terrorism 
Research Paper, February.  
Besides the terrorist threat, criminal networks, 
and human smuggling rackets are booming. The 
situation is further exacerbated by the existence 
of several armed militias, which are allegedly 
affiliated to one of the two parliaments in 
Tobruk and Tripoli but are de facto autonomous 
and uncontrollable.2 Reports by UNSMIL and 
UN OHCHR3 on the human rights situation in 
Libya show that all parties involved in the 
conflict have been abusing human rights and 
violating international humanitarian law since 
2014. An investigation by UN OHCHR released 
on 15 February 2016 shows that violations, 
including torture, summary executions, 
indiscriminate attacks and unlawful killings 
persist. The situation is particularly precarious 
for refugees and migrants. Some 440,000 
Libyans have become internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) since 2011. Tens of thousands of 
non-Libyan migrants and refugees are said to 
reside in Libya. Each week 1,500 migrants and 
refugees arrive in Tripoli via the Western Sahara 
route.4  
The stabilisation puzzle  
The idea of a stabilisation force for Libya has so 
far met political resistance in most European 
countries, because of the limited appetite for 
long-term interventions and the high risk of 
casualties. The EU sent a small-scale border-
assistance mission to Libya in 2013 – recently 
extended – consisting of 100 personnel and a 
paltry annual budget of €30 million, which 
relocated to Tunisia in April 2014. Their efforts 
were in vain. Libyan authorities – the National 
Transitional Council (2011-2012), the General 
National Congress (2012-2014) and the House of 
Representatives (2014-present) – have been 
reluctant to invite a more substantial 
stabilisation force, fearing a prolonged 
occupation like the ones stationed in 
                                                     
2 See: the “Guide to Key Libyan Militias”, BBC, 11 
January 2016 (www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-19744533).  
3 See: UNSMIL/UNOHCHR (2015), “Report on the 
human rights situation in Libya”, 16 November 2015.  
4 See: “Facts on the European Dimension of 
Displacement and Asylum: Libya”, Bertelsmann 
Foundation, February 2016.  
4 | GIOVANNI FALEG 
 
Afghanistan and Iraq. While it would have been 
unwise to deploy troops in Libya without the 
consent of the Libyans, the absence of basic 
security to support the transition process has 
ultimately caused its failure.  
The worsening of the security situation since the 
formation of a Daesh branch in Libya has 
sparked a political debate in Western capitals 
about the need for renewed direct military 
action by a coalition to restore Libya’s 
sovereignty and to protect the civilian 
population. It is now an open secret that 
American, British and French special forces have 
been present in the country, fighting Daesh, 
gathering intelligence and training Libyan 
forces.5 As a formal intervention still depends on 
a request for assistance from a legitimate Libyan 
government, and agreement among rival parties 
has so far proved difficult, other options have 
been explored in European capitals and in 
Washington, moving beyond the LPA. A ‘plan 
B’ for Libya calls for the division of the country 
into three states: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and 
Fezzan. The plan may be a pragmatic solution to 
overcome the current political stalemate, to 
avoid the collapse of the transition process and 
to prevent an almost inevitable humanitarian 
disaster. The question is whether multiplying 
borders and creating new centres of power is an 
appropriate response, and what the implications 
for the Libyan people will be. A break-up would 
also establish a precedent in international law, 
with unknown consequences for other conflicts 
in Africa and elsewhere. A possible ‘plan C’ - 
unilateral intervention - is opposed by Italy, the 
UK and France, which do not wish to launch 
military action without the explicit request of 
the Libyan authorities. Intervention could also 
be opposed by the European public, and it could 
be difficult to complete any operation without 
the support, or at the very least the 
endorsement, of the Libyan people and the 
different factions in the country. This is quite 
apart from the likely reactions to this plan in 
other capitals, namely Moscow and Beijing.   
                                                     
5 See O. Guitta (2016) “ISIL’s gains in Libya and the 
case for intervention”, Al Jazeera, 3 March 
(www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/isil-
gains-libya-case-intervention-isis-
160301090505840.html).  
The way forward 
As things stand, doing nothing in Libya would 
do harm and endanger refugees. Leaving Libya 
in a state of chaos and allowing Daesh to gain 
more ground is not an option the international 
community can afford to contemplate. This is 
the underlying argument in support of the 
military operations that are currently being 
planned – and it is a fairly reasonable one.  
Post-conflict stabilisation is still as much of a 
challenge in Libya as it was four years ago, 
despite the obvious need for a post-Gaddafi 
transition to build trust, develop institutions 
and engage tribal and social forces in the 
country. The underlying problem of Libyan 
sovereignty, or sovereignties, is difficult to 
solve.  
Bearing in mind that no action can guarantee a 
positive outcome in foreign and security policy, 
four practical recommendations could help to 
change the game and mitigate the problems in 
Libya.  
1. Understand Libya’s fragility. Libya should not 
be seen as a battleground for Daesh and 
regional powers, but as a country riven by 
conflict and violence. The root causes of 
Libya’s fragility are manifold and 
interconnected: the fight for control of the 
country’s rich oil and energy resources; rival 
and tribal claims to legitimacy over 
territories; religious conflict between Islamist 
and non-Islamist groups; social violence; 
poverty and lack of governance. Foreign 
powers should understand and act to 
address the causes of this fragility, because 
failing to do so will only backfire on their 
national interests, directly or indirectly. 
Currently, they neither understand nor 
address this fragility, but it is an underlying 
fact that diplomats and military planners 
should hang on their office walls to guide 
any action they take.    
2. The domestic politics of intervening powers 
should not prevent stabilisation. There is no 
quick fix or low-cost, low-risk operation in 
Libya. Sustained commitment, adequate 
financial resources and a military force on 
the ground are required to achieve the 
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stabilisation of Libya in the long term, which 
would allow security, humanitarian and 
development actors to operate in the 
country. In Europe and in the US, public 
opinion remains largely opposed to the 
deployment of ground troops overseas. The 
hard truth is that boots on the ground are a 
necessary element of stabilisation, however 
politically toxic this argument can be. Air 
power cannot help to stabilise a country, but 
neither can small-scale special operations. 
Political leaders should explain the 
implications of Libya becoming a ‘Somalia in 
the Mediterranean’ to their electorates. An 
effective communication strategy is therefore 
paramount for Western public opinion to 
accept a long and costly involvement in 
conflict. The domestic factor bears particular 
relevance for countries that are approaching 
elections: the UK will hold a referendum on 
EU membership in June 2016, and 2017 will 
see presidential elections in France and 
federal elections in Germany. Last but not 
least, Libya could affect the presidential race 
in the United States, namely Hillary 
Clinton’s campaign, given the role she 
played in supporting opposition groups 
during the 2011 revolution against Gaddafi 
and the political responsibility she bears for 
the attacks in Benghazi.  
3. More diplomacy is needed to engage regional 
powers. It is the responsibility of diplomacy 
to identify creative solutions to political 
logjams. This is desperately needed in Libya, 
whether it means exploring the possibility of 
a three-state plan, or pushing local parties to 
accept a UN protectorate. The diplomatic 
capacity of the EU and the US combined is 
huge; it is high time to refocus and allocate 
all necessary resources to resolving Libya’s 
political impasse. EU member states must 
act in synergy, as this will also impact on 
their capacity to engage with regional 
powers, namely Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This logic also 
applies to other crises in Syria and Yemen.  
4. Military plans should include a post-conflict 
peacebuilding strategy. Planning for 
stabilisation ahead cannot be neglected this 
time. Libya will not heal itself after five years 
of civil war if the root causes are not 
addressed. There must be multidimensional 
and integrated post-conflict security 
measures to guarantee a stable process of 
political and institutional development. It 
should be the task of political leaders to 
push more proactively for those measures to 
be implemented. A UN protectorate could 
be a cornerstone of this framework, 
monitoring and fostering the transition 
towards an effective governance system by 
supporting the political process of 
reconciliation; coordinating assistance 
(namely humanitarian, in the short term) 
from other international agencies; 
jumpstarting basic administrative functions 
and service delivery; overseeing access to 
energy sources and energy security. Its 
mandate should also include engagement in 
confidence-building and facilitation 
measures at the national and local levels to 
foster social cohesion and dialogue among 
tribes; the coordination of security system 
reform and disarmament; demobilisation 
and reintegration of armed militias; and 
other security-related tasks, together with 
other international agencies. There could be 
room for a greater EU role in maritime and 
border security, for instance, by expanding 
the mandates of EUNAVFOR MED 
(Operation Sophia) and EUBAM Libya, 
providing them with the necessary 
capacities to deliver appropriate assistance. 
The presence of multiple international 
actors, including regional organisations and 
financial institutions, may be the game-
changer that pushes Libyans to accept a 
broader stabilisation framework and deliver 
post-conflict reconstruction.  
Prompt disbursement of financial aid to 
rebuild essential infrastructures and public 
sectors could play a pacifying role, and 
create incentives for Libyan leaders to make 
a political agreement work. From being a 
hard case for peacebuilding, Libya has the 
potential to become a model of effective 
multilateralism, if actors begin working on a 
division of labour.  
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Conclusion 
Despite all the limitations and conditions on the 
ground, tackling Libya’s fragility ultimately 
demands a change of mindset. In essence: one 
cannot expect Libyans to be united if 
international actors supporting them are 
divided over who should rule. Military action 
will not bring about security without a 
sustained process of reconstructing the security 
system. The ultimate goal of a military 
campaign should not only be to defeat Daesh, 
but to provide Libyans with a stable, secure and 
inclusive society. This would be the most 
powerful weapon against terrorism in the 
country.  
